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Abstract: Martin Heidegger rejects the traditional definition of the human being as the 
“rational animal” in part because he thinks it fits us into a genus that obscures our difference in 
kind.  Thomas Aquinas shares with Heidegger the concern about the human difference, and yet 
he appropriates the definition, “rational animal” by conceiving animality in terms of the 
specifically human power of understanding being.  Humans are not just distinct in their openness 
to being, but, thanks to that openness, they are distinct in their animality, a distinction that 
changes the very significance of animality itself.  Heidegger also thinks the traditional definition 
closes us to the experience of our essence, but again Aquinas has resources for bringing out the 
experiential character of rational animality.  Aquinas’ inclusion of animation has significance for 
what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology; by virtue of the human animate body, particular 
beings can be pointed out and designated as such. 
 
 
“In the middle ages and in Greek 
philosophy, the whole man was still 
seen; the apprehension of inner 
psychic life, what we now so readily 
call consciousness, was enacted in a 
natural experience which was not 
regarded as an inner perception and 
so set off from an outer one.” 
—Martin Heidegger1 
 
Martin Heidegger rejects the traditional definition of the human being as the rational 
animal.  He thinks it fits us into a genus that obscures our difference in kind.  More pointedly, he 
thinks that obscuring openness to being as distinctively human closes us to the difference 
between entities and their being.  Hence the failure to understand the human is also and more 
importantly a failure to understand being.  Some thinkers have criticized Heidegger’s rejection of 
the traditional definition.  Hans Jonas thinks the rejection makes the human a stranger in the 
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cosmos, and Alasdair MacIntyre thinks the rejection leaves virtue without a home in human 
nature.
2
  Elsewhere I have defended Heidegger’s belief that humans do in fact differ in kind from 
animals.
3
  One puzzle, given this difference in kind, is how to construe the undeniable kinship of 
the human and the animal.  And it is here that I think that Heidegger’s rejection of the traditional 
definition of the human as the rational animal becomes problematical.  For though we differ in 
kind from other animals, we remain yet an animal, and our animality is not foreign to our 
openness to being.  In this paper, I aim to solve the theoretical problems that led Heidegger to 
this position and to show how their solution proves fruitful for Heidegger’s question concerning 
the meaning of being.    
Thomas Aquinas shares many of Heidegger’s concerns regarding human uniqueness and 
yet makes his own the traditional definition of the human being as the rational animal.  He does 
this by reconfiguring animality in view of the specifically human power of understanding being.  
At the same time, Aquinas does not make explicit the role of the animate body in making 
metaphysics possible; he does not develop the problematic that Heidegger calls “fundamental 
ontology.”  He does not lay bare the condition for the possibility of ontology in terms of the 
openness of the human and the temporality or truth of being.  He also does not adequately 
consider the methodological difficulties involved in targeting the person as such, an issue that 
Heidegger engages more penetratingly.  The encounter with Heidegger brings out the latent 
riches of Aquinas’s approach to human nature for a task, fundamental ontology, not explicitly 
undertaken by Aquinas.   
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My project is to remedy the shortcomings of both Heidegger and Aquinas by bringing 
them into a constructive dialogue concerning the nature of the human being and its place in 
fundamental ontology.  While saving the definition may have wider application, such as situating 
ethics within a cosmic setting, I think saving animality is crucial for Heidegger’s project of 
fundamental ontology.  If animality is included in the unified openness to being that is the 
human, then animation plays a constitutive role in our understanding of being.  Thanks to our 
animate bodies, we can point things out in their radical particularity as this something.   
The paper has four parts.  In the first, I lay out Heidegger’s assorted reasons for finding 
the traditional definition problematical.  In the second, I introduce Aquinas’s strategies for 
addressing at least some of the worries Heidegger has.  Then, in the third, I get to the heart of the 
issue by examining Heidegger’s phenomenological rather than metaphysical approach to being 
human, an approach that finds a perhaps unlikely ally in some of Aquinas’s own remarks on the 
life lived by the embodied human intellectual soul.  Finally, I argue that Aquinas’s inclusion of 
animation and Heidegger’s exclusion of animation affect the project of fundamental ontology: 
for Aquinas, our animate bodies have significance in allowing us to target the particularity of 
what is; for Heidegger, lacking such an emphasis, that particularity proves to be elusive.  I argue 
that the difference between Heidegger and Aquinas concerning the status of the definition, 
“rational animal,” is not merely semantic; it rather expresses something essential for the 
experience of what we are and of what is. 
 
I 
Heidegger’s Case against “Rational Animal.”  Heidegger has six or so worries 
concerning the definition rational animal.  (1) The first concerns the inadequacy of a definition 
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for arriving at the way of being characteristic of the human being.  Specifically, he thinks that a 
definition is by nature restricted to “outward appearance” (Aussehen).  In 1925, he writes, “We 
place ourselves in principle outside of this experiential and interrogative horizon outlined by the 
definition of the most customary name for this entity, man: homo animal rationale.  What is to 
be determined is not an outward appearance of this entity but from the outset and throughout 
solely its way to be, not the what of that of which it is composed but the how of its being and the 
characters of this how.”4  Earlier in the same course, however, Heidegger gave a more generous 
reading of the traditional approach to the human being: “In the middle ages and in Greek 
philosophy, the whole man was still seen; inner psychic life, what we now so readily call 
consciousness, was apprehended in a natural experience which was not regarded as an inner 
perception and so set off from an outer one.”5  His assessment is therefore ambiguous: Do the 
ancients and medievals restrict themselves to outward appearance in defining the human or do 
they, in contrast to the moderns, have a sense of the whole human being?  This turns out to be the 
central question, which I will return to below. 
 (2) The second problem Heidegger has with the traditional definition is that rationality is 
an inadequate translation of logos.  According to his reading of philosophy, logos comes from 
the experience of the being of entities thanks to the power that was traditionally termed intellect 
or understanding.  Though logos originally meant speaking, a specific kind of speaking, 
assertion, came to dominate reflection on logos and consequently to determine the human as the 
animal that makes judgements and reasons from them.
6
  This objection, however, does not 
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appear intractable, for it means only that the specific difference is not understood amply enough.  
It suggests that we can save the definition by either changing the formal indication of the specific 
difference to “understanding” or by stipulating that when we say “rational” we intend an 
openness to being more aptly indicated by the term “language” or “word.”  As he translates it in 
one place, “the human being is the living entity to whom the word belongs.”7  Yes, Heidegger 
does excoriate the tradition of ratio as negligent concerning ontological openness, but he follows 
the tradition in thinking there is a human difference.  Thus, for Heidegger the fatal flaw of the 
definition, “rational animal,” is not the invocation of a difference, although he is vexed 
concerning the traditional characterization of this difference. 
(3) A more pressing set of objections to the definition “rational animal” comes from the 
designation of a genus, animality, to which the human is said to belong.  In the first place, 
Heidegger thinks that, insofar as animality is approached through contemporary biology and this 
inquiry is conceived as a purely ontic inquiry into the push and pull of mechanical causality, 
there is no way to relate animality to the human openness to being.  In Being and Time he writes, 
“‘Man’ is here defined as a , and this is Interpreted to mean an animal 
rationale, something living which has reason.  But the kind of Being which belongs to a  is 
understood in the sense of occurring and Being-present-at-hand.”8  But again, this is a trivial 
objection, for no traditional proponent of the definition regarded animality as merely a substance 
with properties.  Rather the proponents of the traditional definition regarded the soul as the 
principle of animation, which also opens up the animal to an environment of action and 
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perception.  Nor is there any necessity for us to interpret animality as present-at-hand today; 
Evan Thompson and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone articulate a conception of animation consonant 
with contemporary science and nonetheless consistent with classical sensibilities.
9
  And 
Heidegger himself tells us, “Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein.”10   
In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger develops this suggestion in a way 
relevant to our question concerning the rational animal.  Heidegger says that while a stone is 
worldless and Dasein is world-forming, an animal is poor in world.  “We shall begin our 
comparative analysis by starting from the middle, that is, by asking what it means to say that the 
animal is poor in world.”11  Why should we begin with the middle?  After all, is that not what the 
definition, “rational animal,” does?  The middle allows us to keep the whole spectrum in view: 
“Thus we shall also constantly be looking to two sides at once, both toward the worldlessness of 
the stone and toward the world-forming of man, and from there in turn back toward the animal 
and its poverty in world.”  Animal world-poverty functions analogous to the role of the ready-to-
hand in Being and Time; that is, it stands in between the present-at-hand and Dasein, and its 
difference from the merely present-at-hand helps illumine the world that arises properly with 
Dasein.  For the animal, the disinhibiting ring of drives that lock the animal into its environment 
both anticipates and falls short of the openness to world that defines Dasein: “An animal can 
only behave [sich … benehmen] but can never apprehend [vernehmen] something as 
something—which is not to deny that the animal sees or even perceives.  Yet in a fundamental 
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sense the animal does not have perception [Wahrnehmung].”12  The items to which the animal 
relates in its behavior (he gives the example of a lizard on a stone) are beings only for Dasein, 
not for the animals themselves: “From the perspective of the animal we should never take these 
other things as beings, though for us it is only possible to approach such things by way of 
naming through language.”13  The animal does not have access to itself or to its items of interest 
as beings, but they themselves and their items of interest can show up for us, as Dasein, in no 
other way than as beings.  Hence, world in some way includes animal and environment while 
animal and environment does not include world.  What we can take from this text, for our 
question, is twofold: Heidegger does indeed think Dasein can transpose itself into the life of 
animals, and Dasein can do so because in some sense world includes the environment of animals, 
including it in such a way that its meaning becomes transfigured by the inclusion.  To regard 
Dasein as in some sense an animal would not mean that Dasein is to be assimilated to the 
present-at-hand.  Therefore, this objection to the traditional definition is insubstantial. 
(4) A more significant objection concerns the idea of including the human within a genus 
at all.  The problem with doing so, Heidegger thinks, is that what is specifically human appears 
to be layered atop something that is generically living.  In Being and Time, he writes: 
Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein.  
The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines 
what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben].  
Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein.  In turn, Dasein is never to be 
defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus 
something else.
14
  
 
Despite this suggestion that designating a genus undermines the unity of Dasein, the passage 
does open the possibility of achieving a unified conception of Dasein as that living entity open to 
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being, provided that life is ontologically clarified, that openness to being is seen as somehow 
seamlessly integrated with this ontologically clarified life, and that the unified ontologically open 
living entity called Dasein could be ontologically investigated as such.  For the question arises, 
how can life be accessible in Dasein unless Dasein is in some sense alive?    
Despite expressing an unambiguous aversion to defining Dasein, Heidegger cannot 
escape the necessity of characterizing the human in terms of genus and specific difference: 
“Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontologically.”15  In the “genus” of entities, we are the 
only ones that are open to being.  Openness to being, then, can count as our specific difference.  
The genus entity seems even more dangerous than the genus animal, for an entity, as opposed to 
an animal, could very well be something present-at-hand; nonetheless, Heidegger proposes it all 
the same, and he does so all the while maintaining that Dasein has a consistent tendency to 
misunderstand itself in terms of what it is not, present-at-hand entities.   
Heidegger later comes to think the definition is even more dangerous, and this for two 
reasons.  (5) It does not clearly confront the metaphysical tradition that regards world-openness 
as the quality of an entity instead of something that happens to and through an entity, the 
happening of which is not itself entitative: “History of this question concerning entities is the 
history of metaphysics, history of the thinking that thinks being as the being of an entity from out 
of and unto an entity.”16  (6) Heidegger comes to emphasize more and more the changing 
complexion of our relatedness to being instead of the ahistorical treatment of relation 
characteristic of metaphysics.  But despite these worries about entitativeness and history, the 
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later Heidegger simply cannot avoid presenting the uniqueness of our historical relatedness in 
terms of a genus-species definition involving an entity: 
In the history of beyng, humans in their essence are addressed for the sake of a reply to 
this claim in the mode of the truth of beyng.   
 This distinctiveness of the human being, to be the historical entity that alone 
encounters entities out of the preservation (care for the clearing) of beyng in the 
consigning, without becoming an object of representation, nevertheless excludes every 
anthropomorphism.  Nor can this distinctiveness—the nobility of the indigence of 
steadfastness in Da-seyn—ever be understood in terms of metaphysics.17 
 
Among entities, humans alone are historical due to their dynamic relatedness to the being of 
entities.  If Heidegger does not think that regarding Dasein as generically an entity is inherently 
dangerous, why should he think that regarding Dasein as generically an animal is inherently 
dangerous?  Animals are entities, after all, and, unlike entities in general, animals are quite 
obviously not present-at-hand things in the world.  Heidegger might rightly worry concerning the 
ultimate adequacy of definition in terms of genus and species; nonetheless it is unavoidable in 
indicating the unique calling of being human. 
In sum, Heidegger has a bundle of worries about the definition rational animal, some 
trivial and others substantial: first, he is concerned that the definition may only target the 
“outward look” of the human; second, the term, “rational,” is a dim shadow of our authentic 
relatedness to being; third, animality is somehow supposed to be regarded wrongly as present-at-
hand; fourth, any genus-species approach appears to layer a difference atop generic sameness; 
fifth, the definition, as an operation of metaphysics, represents openness to being as a function of 
an entity; sixth, the definition, as an operation of metaphysics, fails to heed the changing 
relatedness of the human and being through history.  Of these given worries, some I have 
suggested are more problematical than others.  Heidegger acknowledges that ancient and 
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medieval thought experienced the whole person, inner and outer.  While rationality may not be 
the most apt expression of our difference, there is no objection to regarding that difference in 
terms of understanding being.  Heidegger acknowledges that living beings are not present-at-
hand, and he thinks that life (and presumably animality) is accessible through Dasein, suggesting 
that Dasein has an intrinsic connection to life and animality.  The more serious objections to the 
definition concern the set of issues having to do with definition itself and the designation of a 
genus and species.  Does a genus-species approach require thinking of the human being as 
something specific layered atop something generic?  If so, Heidegger should avoid his 
formulations, early and late, that suggest that humans are distinctive in relation to all other 
entities thanks to their historical care for being.  Heidegger has good reason to define the human 
again and again, for one cannot introduce a distinction without the backdrop of an identity; one 
cannot articulate difference without a corresponding sameness.  Can we address the remaining 
worries?  Is there a way to construe the relation of genus and species that will not destroy the 
unity of the phenomenon?  Does a metaphysical approach to the rational animal represent being 
as a function of entities?  Does it fail to mind the historical relatedness of humans and being?   
 
II 
Aquinas’ Way to Save “Rational Animal.”  For the medieval mind, “animality” enjoys a 
wider semantic field than it does for Heidegger.  For instance, one definition that Augustine 
discusses defines the human as the mortal, rational animal.  The genus is living beings; humans 
are differentiated from beasts through reason and from divine beings through mortality.
18
  
Aquinas likewise sees the human on the verge of two genera: of animal and of created 
intelligences.  He thinks the inclusion of the human person in the genus animality transfigures 
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the meaning of animality.  The human does not add rationality to animality from the outside, as it 
were, so that the human being is animal plus something specifically different.  Rather, animality 
can only serve as the genus for human beings insofar as the possibility of rationality is already 
included within it.  Thus, for Aquinas, regarding the human as the rational animal does not lower 
the human to the animal; it elevates the animal by recognizing the human as a genuine possibility 
of being an animal.   
In On Being and Essence Aquinas writes that the genus animalia includes everything 
essential to every species to be found within it.  Animalia “signifies a thing whose form can be 
the source of sensation and movement, no matter what that form may be, whether it be only a 
sensitive soul or a soul that is both sensitive and rational.”19  Indeed, he maintains that if 
animality did not include rationality, it could not be applied to the human being: “…whatever is 
in the species is also in the genus but in an undetermined way. If indeed ‘animal’ were not 
wholly what ‘man’ is, but only a part of him, ‘animal’ could not be predicated of ‘man’, since no 
integral part may be predicated of its whole.”20  Hence, the relation of genus to specific 
difference, animality to rationality, is not a distinction between two composite parts; rather it is a 
relation between two different ways of articulating the whole: “A genus is not matter, but it is 
taken from matter as designating the whole; and a difference is not form, but it is taken from 
form as designating the whole.  That is why we say that man is a rational animal, and not that he 
is composed of animal and rational, as we say that he is composed of soul and body.”21 
In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas emphasizes that the genus animality does not 
compromise human uniqueness, because it anticipates the essential difference between the non-
rational and the rational:  
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What is more, when things come together by something common to them, they must, if 
they are to be distinguished, be distinguished by differences which belong per se and not 
accidentally to that common thing.  Thus, man and horse meet in animal, and are 
distinguished from one another not by black and white, which are related accidentally to 
animal, but by rational and irrational, which are per se pertinent to animal.  This is 
because animal is what has soul [animam], and this must be distinguished by having this 
or that kind of soul—say, rational or irrational.22   
 
Having understood animality to include a radical per se difference, Aquinas can define the 
human as rational animal without sacrificing the radicality of its openness to being.  A principle 
Aquinas invokes regarding the marvelousness of the Incarnation is applicable here: “that which 
is greatest in any genus seems to be the cause of the others.”23  The human being, which is the 
greatest in the genus of animality, is in some sense that toward which all other animals are 
ordered as to their fulfillment.  In comparison to the surplus of the rational soul by which it 
exceeds the sensitive soul, the latter appears imperfect.
24
  Thus, for Aquinas we should 
understand animality in terms of being human rather than understand being human in terms of 
animality.   
 In addition to widening animality to include rationality, Aquinas deploys a second 
strategy later in On Being and Essence.  He places the human within a second genus, that of 
created spirits: “The human soul … holds the lowest place among intellectual substances.”25  
Like angels, the human is an intellective being with its own per se act of being.  Unlike angels, 
the human’s act of being is communicated to an essence that includes animality.  Hence, the 
human is not only the rational animal; the human is the animate intellect.  In Summa Contra 
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Gentiles, Aquinas sees the human being unite two genera in the unity of its one substance: 
intellective substance and bodily substance.   
We have, therefore, to consider the existence of something supreme in the genus of 
bodies, namely, the human body harmoniously tempered, which is in contact with the 
lowest of the higher genus, namely, the human soul, which holds the lowest rank in the 
genus of intellectual substances, as can be seen from its mode of understanding; so that 
the intellectual soul is said to be on the horizon and confines of things corporeal and 
incorporeal, in that it is an incorporeal substance and yet the form of a body. Nor is a 
thing composed of an intellectual substance and corporeal matter less one than a thing 
made up of the form of fire and its matter, but perhaps it is more one; because the greater 
the mastery of form over matter, the greater is the unity of that which is made from it and 
matter.
26
 
 
Aquinas regards this overlapping of two genera to be typical of what he calls “the marvelous 
connection of things”: “For it is always found that the lowest in the higher genus touches the 
highest of the lower species. Some of the lowest members of the animal kingdom, for instance, 
enjoy a form of life scarcely superior to that of plants; oysters, which are motionless, have only 
the sense of touch and are fixed to the earth like plants.”27  Aquinas does refrain from defining 
the human as animate intellect on experiential grounds; we are the only species of intellects that 
we can perceive; we cannot know the species of angels; and one cannot define a species in terms 
of a genus when no other species are known.
28
  Despite this limitation, simultaneously including 
humans in a higher genus in principle resists the tendency to reduce the human to a “mere” 
animal. 
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas locates the human within a cosmic scale of 
different modes of emanation (emanationis modus); in the unity of the human essence, the 
animal and the personal are brought together.  While the inanimate interacts only via outer 
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powers, living beings act by acting on themselves, and this kind of agency involves varying 
degrees of inwardness: “living things are those which move themselves to action [viventia sunt 
quae seipsa movent ad agendum].”29  In plants, accordingly, there is some share of inwardness; 
in growing, they proceed from within but bring about something entirely external.  With animals 
this degree of inwardness intensifies; in sensing, they proceed from within and bring something 
external, the perceptual object, to inward awareness; nonetheless, the sense power cannot know 
itself, so the movement from within to without does not entirely return within.  It is otherwise for 
human beings.  In knowing, the human goes beyond itself by means of sensing and then returns 
to itself through knowing to achieve self-knowledge.  Unlike divine or angelic knowledge, which 
knows without an outward movement, human self-knowledge happens thanks to knowing 
something sensible: “For the human intellect, although it can know itself, does indeed take the 
first beginning of its knowledge from without, because it cannot understand without a 
phantasm.”30  Aquinas can thus situate human transcendence within a cosmic scale that 
highlights the uniqueness of our characteristic movement rather than compromises it.   
Aquinas, then, has two related strategies for saving the definition “rational animal.”  
First, he sees the human, the highest in the genus of animal, as that which reveals the complete 
meaning of the genus.  Second, he regards the human, the highest in the genus of animal, as 
being at the same time the lowest in the genus of created intelligences.  Heidegger does not seem 
to take to either of Aquinas’s strategies.  In the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” he remarks, “In 
principle we are still thinking of homo animalis — even when anima [soul] is posited as animus 
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sive mens [spirit or mind], and this in turn is later posited as subject, person, or spirit.”31  This 
approach tells us something correct about the human being but it remains within the parameters 
of the metaphysical question concerning what something is and remains outside the experience 
in which the human person comes into his or her own: “Metaphysics closes itself to the simple 
essential fact that the human being essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by 
being.”32  The same critique applies, it seems, also to the approach that would locate the human 
person within a genus that includes higher beings: “Are we really on the right track toward the 
essence of the human being as long as we set him off as one living creature among others in 
contrast to plants, beasts, and God?”33  Thus, it seems that Aquinas’s two strategies, while 
perhaps undercutting some of the force of Heidegger’s objections, still miss what is essential. 
   
III 
Experiencing the Human Essence.  Heidegger introduces the term Dasein in Being and 
Time by calling to mind two inseparable features of that entity for whom being is an issue: 
Dasein, unlike other sorts of things, is characterized by freedom and unrealized possibilities of 
acting and experiencing, and Dasein, unlike other sorts of things, exists for its own sake.  
Aquinas, too, is aware that the singularity of a human being, who has a mastery of his or her own 
actions, is significantly different from the singularity of other sorts of beings.
34
  How does the 
unique human essence show up in experience?  On his quest to understand the human from out 
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of the experience of being, Heidegger develops a new philosophical method called “formal 
indication.”35  Instead of the classical logic of definition in terms of genus and species, 
Heidegger proposes a logic of experiential indexicals, aimed to signify and motivate a shift in 
experiential register, from what is experienced, through how it is experienced, to the very 
modality of self at work in the experiencing.  That is, he follows Husserl in distinguishing the act 
and the object of intentionality, but he goes further in envisioning a dual mode to the act: it can 
be enacted inauthentically or authentically.  In the inauthentic register, the focus is on the object 
intended.  In the authentic register, the focus retreats to the widest horizon, to set the intentional 
relation within the ultimate context in which it takes place.  In the authentic register, there is not 
simply an experience of an item in the world; there is an experience of having an experience of 
an item in the world.  Central, then, to Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology is the 
character of the enactment (Vollzug):   
Each experience—as experiencing, and what is experienced—can “be taken in the 
phenomenon,” that is to say, one can ask: 
1. After the original “what,” that is experienced therein (content). 
2. After the original “how,” in which it is experienced (relation). 
3. After the original “how,” in which the relational meaning is enacted 
(enactment). 
 But these three directions of sense (content-, relational-, enactment-sense) do not 
simply coexist.  “Phenomenon” is the totality of sense in these three directions.  
“Phenomenology” is explication of this totality of sense; it gives the “ ” of the 
phenomenon, “ ” in the sense of “verbum internum” (not in the sense of 
logicalization).
36
 
 
On the basis of this more comprehensive modality of experience, one can philosophize and bring 
to articulation the various transcendental structures that are at work in that experience (facticity, 
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fallenness, and the like).  The mention of the Latin term, verbum internum, in this context is 
provocative, and we will return to it below; in Being and Time, Heidegger will appropriate the 
idea of the internal word in terms of the call of conscience.
37
  The later Heidegger will suppress 
the name “formal indication” and come to emphasize the historicity of authentic experience, but 
the basic approach persists.
38
  Heidegger finds every genus-species approach to the human 
problematical, because it remains closed to the formally indicative logic that shows us what is 
really essential to the human.  We are not merely an entity within a cosmic scheme of entities; 
we are an entity open to the being of all entities and, in order to think about this openness, we 
need to turn from the entities themselves to the question of their being experienced.  Heidegger 
introduces formal indication to articulate the intrinsic intelligibility of our way of being; he 
regards all generalization in terms of genus and species to be a way of conceiving us in terms of 
what we are not; in this way, generalization misses what is essential to being human.  
Now, it might seem that Aquinas would not be sympathetic to formal indication, because 
he belongs to the tradition it is deployed to overcome.  However, in De Veritate, we find Aquinas 
doing something that seems quite similar to Heidegger’s formal indication.  Aquinas articulates 
the shift required for thinking about the condition for the possibility of truth; we have to know 
the active principle and its relatedness to that which is: 
Truth follows the operation of the intellect inasmuch as it belongs to the intellect to judge 
about a thing as it is. And truth is known by the intellect in view of the fact that the 
intellect reflects upon its own act—not merely as knowing its own act, but as knowing 
the proportion of its act to the thing. Now, this proportion cannot be known without 
knowing the nature of the act; and the nature of the act cannot be known without knowing 
the nature of the active principle, that is, the intellect itself, to whose nature it belongs to 
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be conformed to things. Consequently, it is because the intellect reflects upon itself 
[supra seipsum reflectitur] that it knows truth.
39
 
 
Shifting from what is experienced to the act that experiences and thinking about this act as the 
expression of an active principle corresponds, in outline form, with Heidegger’s logic of formal 
indication.  In commenting on this passage, Heidegger focuses on Aquinas’ sense of self-
reflection, which he uncharitably identifies with the Cartesian cogito me cogitare; in point of 
fact, Aquinas is insisting, contrary to a kind of angelic or Cartesian anthropology, that self-
knowledge in the human being begins by first encountering things outside us through sense 
perception; only on this basis can we return to ourselves and reflect on our agency in making 
sense of things.
40
  Moreover, some self-awareness is to be found resident in the experience itself; 
reflection does not construct but elucidate the sense of self already present in the intentional 
experience.
41
  Still, Heidegger is likely right in his general judgment that while Aquinas does 
have various accounts of the relatedness of the intellect to being he does not quite explain the 
modalization of experience necessary to bring this abstract relatedness to concrete, intuitive 
givenness.
42
  In that way, Aquinas could benefit from Heidegger’s development of 
phenomenological logic, which brings to intuitive givenness the transcendental relatedness of 
mind to world that Aquinas rightly considers.   
No doubt there are limits to definitions when we seek self-understanding and that the 
phenomenological task is to come into an experience of that which is essential, to encounter our 
essentiality.  However, is Heidegger correct that the definition, “rational animal,” distracts us 
from what is essential?  It would be such a distraction only if animality were unrelated to the 
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experience of being claimed by being.  But this seems highly questionable.  Isn’t animation 
central to our indexicality, central to our role in providing a place for things to manifest 
themselves in their intelligibility?   What if Heidegger were right in his 1925 judgment, quoted at 
the outset?   
In the middle ages and in Greek philosophy, the whole man was still seen; the 
apprehension of inner psychic life, what we now so readily call consciousness, was 
enacted [vollzogen] in a natural experience which was not regarded as an inner perception 
and so set off from an outer one.
 43 
 
Did the medieval and Greek apprehension happen upon an enactment of experience that had the 
virtue of failing to separate off the inner from the outer?  Did this enactment express itself in the 
definition rational animal?  And, if so, what value might this original unity have for fundamental 
ontology? 
 One way to proceed is to ask how the genus-specific definition, “rational animal,” can 
interface with the self-knowledge of each person as an individual knower, as an agent of 
experience.  Heidegger’s discussion of self-knowledge involves transparency concerning human 
existence as being-alongside the world and being-with others, a transparency brought about 
inwardly in terms of the call of conscience.
44
  He does not speak of the way this self-knowledge 
shows up outwardly; the animate body is curiously absent from his account.
45
  Aquinas has 
occasion to discuss self-knowledge as a rational animal while philosophizing in light of 
Trinitarian theology.  Recall that Heidegger’s formal indication sought a meaning to the 
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phenomena “in the sense of ‘verbum internum’ (not in the sense of logicalization).”46  Here 
Aquinas points to the interior word as the means for achieving self-understanding: 
When our intellect understands itself, the being of the intellect is one being, and that of its 
act of understanding another, for the substance of the intellect was in potency to 
understanding before it actually understood.  Consequently, the being of the intention 
understood is one being and that of the intellect itself is another being, since the being of 
the intention understood is the very being understood.  Necessarily, then, in a man 
understanding himself, the word interiorly conceived [verbum interius conceptum] is not 
a true man having the natural being [esse] of man, but is only man understood, a kind of 
likeness, as it were, of the true man which the intellect grasps [quasi quaedam similitudo 
hominis veri ab intellectu apprehensa].
47
   
 
Note that Aquinas takes pains to say that this appearance of the self to the self is not really a 
likeness understood as a copy; instead it is a genuine presentation of what exists, the existing 
man, without being a kind of duplication.  Aquinas points out in the next paragraph that “for this 
man is neither his humanity nor his act of being.”48  How does the interior word present the unity 
of this man?  Does this self-understanding of understanding draw life from rational animality?  
Despite his insistence on sense perception for self-knowledge, does Aquinas here anticipate the 
Cartesian principle of self-reflection after all?  Is Heidegger correct in his judgment that 
experience remains foreign to the definition, rational animal? 
 Against the Averroists, Aquinas affirms, “This man [hic homo] understands.”49  Each 
person has his own act of understanding.  Only if the intellectual soul animates this body is it 
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possible to say that this man understands.
50
  And, as animated bodies, we find ourselves in the 
midst of other animated bodies:   
When we see that a man is moved and performs other works, we perceive that there is 
present in him some cause of these operations which is not present in other things, and 
we call this cause the soul; yet we do not know at that point what the soul is, whether it is 
a body, or how it produces these operations which have been mentioned.
51
 
 
The interior word grasps the self as an embodied rational animal that shows up in the world 
thanks to bodily movement and action.  The animate body proves to be the localized center for 
the manifestation of the person:   
For “person” in general signifies the individual substance of a rational nature. The 
individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore “person” in any 
nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, 
these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, 
though not belonging to “person” in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a 
particular human person.
52
 
  
In articulating the metaphysics of human individuality, Aquinas points to the particular matter 
that makes up the person.  At the same time, he points to the experience of that incarnate spirit: 
he or she shows up in the domain of experience so we can point to this person as other than that 
person.  Aquinas’s interior word, then, contains an implicit reference to the experience of 
rational embodiment that is distinct from all others.  Self-knowledge comes from the domain of 
interpersonal animation.  When we point to a rational animal, we point to a pointer.  We point to 
one who not only perceives the world but who understands the logic of points of view and can 
direct the views of others.  We point to human persons, the pointers in the world.   
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Though Heidegger does talk about Dasein without this flesh, these bones, and this 
animating principle, the question arises whether this neglect does not handicap his efforts to 
establish fundamental ontology.  In other words, is anything lost due to his one-sided focus on 
the inside of experience in the call of conscience and his neglect of the outwardness of 
experience in the thisness of interpersonal encounter?  Can Dasein point to Dasein pointing?  
Moreover, does Aquinas grasp the ontological implications of his animate approach to being 
human?  Can the debate concerning animation and experiencing the human essence illumine the 
task of fundamental ontology? 
 
IV 
Rational Animal and Fundamental Ontology.  In 1922, Heidegger drafted the 
introduction to a book on Aristotle that never came to be.  In that text he mentions briefly the 
Aristotelian approach to animality as providing a concrete approach to intentionality and 
intelligibility.  He planned to treat “human life and its movement,” worked out in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, within a wider context of natural movement: 
We first provide an interpretation of De anima with respect to its ontological and logical 
structure, and indeed this itself is carried out on the broader basis of an explication of the 
domain of the being of life as a particular kind of movement (i.e., on the basis of an 
interpretation of De motu animalium).  What is shown here is how “intentionality” comes 
into view for Aristotle and indeed as “objective,” i.e., as a how of the movement of life 
that is somehow “noetially” illuminated when it goes about its dealings.  Beings in their 
basic aspect of being-moved, i.e., their “being out for” and “going toward,” constitute the 
forehaving and condition that makes it possible for us to bring intentionality into relief in 
accord with how it becomes explicit in Aristotle and for its part makes visible the basic 
characteristic of .
53
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According to this view, Aristotle provides the way to understand intentionality from the outside 
through the movement of animals, and this movement helps explicate the specifically human 
sense of .  Rather than developing this insight, Heidegger in Being and Time runs his 
analysis of Dasein independent of the question of animate movement.  Hence he treats of time 
(and space) as structures of experience that can be grasped through authentic existence; he passes 
over the movement that puts time and space into play thanks to our bodily way of being.  
Heidegger’s rejection of “rational animality” and his rejection of animate movement as clue to 
the human being go hand in hand.  What would have been the advantage had Heidegger 
approached fundamental ontology through interpersonal animate movement? 
In Logical Investigations, Husserl accomplished two things of lasting significance for 
Heidegger’s project.  First, he refuted psychologism, the attempt to handle truth in terms of 
empirical principles.  As early as 1912, Heidegger claims that Husserl’s investigations “have 
truly broken the psychological spell”: “While Frege overcame psychologism in principle, 
Husserl in his Prolegomena to a Pure Logic has systematically and comprehensively confronted 
the essence, relativistic consequences, and theoretical worthlessness of psychologism.”54  
Second, Husserl developed the principles to account for the way truth shows up in experience in 
terms of the play of emptily intending and then bodily perceiving one and the same object.  The 
experience of the identity of thought and perceptual presence is the experience of self-showing or 
truth.  The only way to square the refutation of psychologism and the phenomenology of truth is 
to make the transcendental turn.  The analytic of Being and Time aims to uncover the a priori 
condition for the possibility of experience and thereby to develop Husserl’s phenomenological 
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project: “To disclose the a priori is not to make an ‘a-prioristic’ construction.  Edmund Husserl 
has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical 
empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools.  ‘A-priorism’ is the method of every 
scientific philosophy which understands itself.”55  Heidegger’s discussion of truth as 
disclosedness in Being and Time amounts to a development of this transcendental domain.
56
  
Husserl’s analysis of perception, that is, of intending something in the flesh, makes a tacit 
reference to our embodied selves and our own vantage point.  For only that which is near us, in 
view thanks to our viewpoint, can be present in the flesh.  Our own bodies, not qua physical 
things, but qua centers or origins of experiential exploration, have crucial roles to play in making 
sense of the experience of at least perceptual truths.
57
  Heidegger’s notion of disclosedness 
similarly suggests a kind of exploratory movement without, however, explicitly relating that 
movement to the body which makes such movement possible.
58
 
 Aquinas turns from the movement itself to that which shows up thanks to the movement, 
and he reflects on how that movement reveals something essential to what shows up in that 
movement, a revelation that could not happen in another way.  Aquinas wants to explain the 
thisness of this composite substance and he does so in terms of designate matter.
59
  Now, 
designate matter is matter we can point to, matter that is the term of our animate, bodily 
movement.  It is not abstract but concrete.  Our bodies play, then, a crucial role in allowing us to 
target the concreteness of things.  They not only play a role in accounting for sense perception; 
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they not only play a role in individuating us to be the particular being each of us is; but they play 
a role in what would be Aquinas’s fundamental ontology: our animate bodies, localizing us in the 
here and now, allow us to highlight the particularity of those beings we encounter.  To introduce 
our bodies is to do so not only in terms of their materiality or potency to receive form but also in 
terms of their natural and dynamic possibilities for movement and rest.  We can initiate a 
movement, say stretching out an arm, hand, and index finger, and bring about a rest, thereby 
targeting the thing in its particularity.  We puzzle over the , the hoc aliquid, the this 
something. 
Now, designating the particular is tricky, both because the act of pointing is necessarily 
ambiguous and because language only expresses universality.
60
  In the case of targeting 
something in its particularity it seems necessary to invoke language in order to revoke it: I am 
not pointing to the treeness of the tree, shared in principle by many, but its particularity, its 
thisness.  The pointing makes use of the here and now to make manifest something in its 
particularity not in its hereness and nowness.  It is not a matter of targeting its presence but of 
making it present to target its identity, an identity that remains through the interplay of presence 
and absence, an identity that came to be and may one day cease to be thanks to a constellation of 
causal factors.  At the same time, we do not point to the identity as excluding its intelligibility, 
for these are moments one to another; the particularity of a tree is distinguishable but not 
separable from its being a tree.  To use an example from Heidegger that underscores the human 
difference: “The worker bee is familiar with the blossoms it frequents along with their colour and 
scent, but it does not know the stamens of these blossoms as stamens, it knows nothing about the 
roots of the plant and it cannot know anything about the number of stamens or leaves, for 
                                                          
60
 On disambiguating pointing, see Engelland, Ostension, 171-192. 
26 
 
example.  As against this, the world of man is a rich one. …”61  The bee, closed to the 
intelligibility of the stamen is closed too to its particularity; rather the blossom shows up only 
through the determinations of its drives.  By contrast, we can target the particular identity and 
intelligibility of things independent of our own interests.  In this way, I do not think that 
Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysical tradition, so memorably expressed by Derrida’s phrase, 
“metaphysics of presence,” understands what is at issue in grasping intelligibility; though the 
identity and intelligibility of a thing can only be known through presence, it is known through 
presence as indifferent to presence and absence.
62
 
Aquinas uses thisness without thematizing the animate body’s role in being a condition 
for the possibility of metaphysics.
63
  He does speak about the need of the phantasm for 
understanding, because the phantasm unites our understanding of nature to what actually exists.  
In this way, the phantasm is significant precisely because it retains the bodily pointing-
something-out of experience:  
Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and 
truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual.  Now we apprehend 
the individual through the senses and the imagination.  And, therefore, for the intellect to 
understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order 
to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual.
64
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One way to develop the relevance of bodily movement for Aquinas would be to turn to the 
derivation of the transcendentals in De Veritate.
65
  This is the very passage which Heidegger 
calls our attention to in Being and Time in order to maintain that the analytic of Dasein does not 
amount to a kind of relativism; the apriori relatedness of being to the human soul can be found in 
Aristotle’s dictum that the soul is in a way all things, a point explicitly developed by Aquinas.  
Heidegger writes: 
Aristotle’s principle, which points back to the ontological thesis of Parmenides, is one 
which Thomas Aquinas has taken up in a characteristic discussion.  … Thomas has to 
demonstrate that the verum is such a transcendens.  He does this by invoking an entity 
which, in accordance with its very manner of being, is properly suited to “come together 
with” entities of any sort whatever.  This distinctive entity, the ens quod natum est 
convenire cum omni ente, is the soul (anima).  Here the priority of “Dasein” over all other 
entities emerges, although it has not been ontologically clarified.  This priority has 
obviously nothing in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of entities.
66
   
 
Aquinas calls all being true and good in reference to the intellective soul which is in a way all 
things.  The question to pose to Aquinas is whether this correlation of being and the intellectual 
soul applies only to the intellectual soul qua intellectual soul or also to the intellectual soul qua 
sensitive power?  For in the human though not in God or the angels, the intellective soul 
exercises virtual sensitive powers.
67
  Aquinas says that knowing the truth involves knowing not 
only the essence of what is known and the act of knowing but especially knowing the proportion 
between what is known and the act of knowing, a knowledge that comes from reflecting on the 
act of knowing.  Intellectual substances go out of themselves to know something but the 
movement is completed in a return to self.  Aquinas introduces this movement in order to 
observe that sense perception in a way begins the return to self but does not complete it: “Since 
sense is closer to an intellectual substance than other things are, it begins to return to its essence; 
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it not only knows the sensible, but it also knows that it senses. Its return, however, is not 
complete, since it does not know its own essence.”68  Only the intellect can know itself in its act 
of knowing and know the relation of itself and the object known.   
I would like to develop this point beyond what Aquinas explicitly says.  Can the intellect 
know the proportion of our bodily, sensing, moving being to our knowledge of material beings?  
In On the Soul, Aristotle identifies three interrelated foci of meaning: the intellect, the sensitive 
soul, and the hand.  He writes: “It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand 
is a tool of tools, so thought is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.”69  Can 
we not expand what Aquinas says about truth’s relatedness to the knowing power and maintain 
that, in relation to the incarnate intellective soul, all material being is able to be designated?  That 
the condition for the possibility of doing metaphysics about material beings is having an 
intellectual soul which, thanks to animating a body, can allow us to point to things in their 
particularity?   
Aquinas seems to move in this direction in detailing his “history of being” in the Summa 
Theologiae.  There he iterates three epochs of inquiry into being, epochs defined by the limits of 
their horizon of questioning.  In the beginning, philosophers were “grosser” in mind and 
therefore conceived of being in terms of bodily qualities alone.
70
   But then Plato and Aristotle 
happened upon the specificity of bodies in terms of substantial forms that we can point out; our 
bodies allow us to target the particularity and substantiality of bodily being.  What this horizon 
of questioning does not include, however, is the availability of the matter contracted by the 
substantial form, either in the being pointed out or, presumably, in the being that points it out.  I 
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say presumably, because Aquinas is committed to the principle that knowing involves knowing 
the proportion of the act of understanding to that which is understood.  Aquinas thinks it was 
necessary, then, to move into a deeper horizon of questioning that grasps being as being: “Then 
others there were who arose to the consideration of ‘being,’ as being, and who assigned a cause 
to things, not as ‘these,’ or as ‘such,’ [haec vel talia] but as ‘beings.’” Aquinas thematizes eras of 
metaphysical inquiry in terms of bodiliness.  In doing so, he highlights the importance of 
pointing to what is in order to progress beyond the Presocratic inquiry.  The final stage, which 
fulfills the original quest to comprehend being as being, marks a third way of appropriating 
bodiliness, not only as having qualities or particular substantiality but also as occupying a wider 
context of existence.  Aquinas sees a historical relatedness to understanding being in terms of the 
animate movement of pointing.
71
   
Aquinas observes that an inanimate object might be right or left relative to the 
explorations of a given animal, but of course this tells us nothing about the object itself except its 
accidental relatedness to the animal’s surrounding world.   
For there is in animals a distinction of the powers from which the relation of right and left 
arises, on which account such a relation truly and really exists in the animal.  Hence, no 
matter how the animal is turned around, the relation always maintains itself in the same 
way, for the right part is never called the left.  Inanimate things, to be sure, which lack the 
powers just mentioned, have no relation of this kind really existing in them, but one 
names them in the relation of right or of left from this: the animals in some way present 
themselves to the inanimate.  Hence, the same column is called now right, now left, 
inasmuch as the animal is compared to it in a different situation.
72
 
 
By contrast, when we point to something in its particularity, we are not targeting something 
accidental to it but instead something constitutive of it.  The pointing is accidental but that which 
the pointing targets is not.  What is the difference between being right or left and this pointing?  
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Being right or left is incidental to what something is; while the fact of being pointed out is still 
incidental, being able to be pointed out is an intrinsic property of something.  It makes no 
difference to the essence of a tree whether it is on the right or left of a hiker, nor does it make a 
difference to that essence whether it is pointed out or known by the hiker.  But it does make a 
difference to that essence that it can be pointed out, that it is something that is particular and able 
to be so designated.  Each thing corresponds with the intellect as knowable and so true, each 
thing corresponds with the will as appetible and so good, and each material thing corresponds 
with the animate body as able to be pointed out and so individual.   
Heidegger realizes formally the need for a fundamental ontology that would relate the 
traditional categories both to the human way of being and to the place in which the human is.  He 
also expands the categories beyond sensible substances to include categories for handy things 
such as tools, for scientific objects of investigation, and for the particularly human way of being.  
However, he neglects the kind of categorial articulation that was the focus of Aristotle and 
Aquinas: the being of living beings. One clue in Being and Time for pursuing the importance of 
the body for fundamental ontology is to recall that Heidegger’s categorial articulation of the 
ready-to-hand and present-to-hand occurs relative to what Aristotle calls the “tool of tools,” 
namely the human hand.  In several texts from the 1940s and 50s, Heidegger develops this 
significance and shows a clear recognition of the importance of the human hand for 
understanding being.  In What Is Called Thinking (1951-52), he writes, “If we are to think of 
man not as a living being but a human being, we must first give attention to the fact that man is 
that being who has his being by pointing to what is, and that particular beings manifest 
themselves as such by such pointing [Zeigen].”73  To be human means to be open to the 
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intelligibility of things.  Even our hands take their significance from this openness: “The hand is 
infinitely different from all grasping organs—paws, claws, or fangs—different by an abyss of 
essence.  Only a being who can speak, that is, think, can have hands and can be handy in 
achieving works of handicraft.”74  Specifically human acts are bound up with the handiness of 
the hand: “Man himself acts [handelt] through the hand [Hand]; for the hand is, together with the 
word, the essential distinction of man.  … Through the hand occur both prayer and murder, 
greeting and thanks, oath and signal, and also the ‘work’ of the hand, the ‘hand-work,’ and the 
tool.”75  The hand expresses the fundamental disclosive activity of Dasein in relation to things 
and other Dasein: “The hand does not only grasp and catch, or push and pull.  The hand reaches 
and extends, receives and welcomes—and not just things: the hand extends itself, and receives its 
own welcome in the hands of others.”76  Even language is spoken in the milieu of the body’s 
gestures.
77
  “Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through the element 
of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element.”78  Openness to being includes 
the body and its animate movement.   
Heidegger considers the difference between the Latin terms anima and animus only to 
conclude that both terms subordinate the human to the animal.  However, he immediately adds a 
qualification that amounts to a retraction: “Animus, it is true, means that thinking and striving of 
human nature [jenes Sinnen und Trachten des Menschenwesens] which always is determined by, 
attuned to, what is [das überall von dem her, was ist, bestimmt und das heißt gestimmt bleibt].”79  
Things are available to us in their intelligibility thanks in part to the striving of our thoughtful 
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animate movement.  But doesn’t that mean we should rethink animality to accommodate this 
extraordinary possibility?  The human act of pointing is among the highest possibilities of 
animality.  Dining and procreation would be two other such possibilities.
80
   
 
V 
Conclusion.  In the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” Heidegger writes, “Of all the beings that 
are, presumably the most difficult to think about are living creatures, because on the one hand 
they are in a certain way most closely akin to us [am nächsten verwandt], and on the other they 
are at the same time separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss.”81  To safeguard the 
difference, he denies himself the vocabulary to articulate the acknowledged kinship.  Humans are 
strangers on the earth.  In making us so he renders the difference suspect, for the kindship of 
humans and animals is evident in our experience.  Should he want to be persuasive in 
safeguarding the difference, he must give an account of the kinship.  Aquinas’s strategy for 
rescuing animality provides an alternative; the abyssal difference between humans and other 
animals transforms the meaning of the whole genus animalia.  The fundamental difference 
affects the sameness.  For Aquinas, ours is not a foreign presence; ours is a transfiguring one, 
which takes up and transforms the meaning of the life led by the other animals that festoon the 
earth we call home. 
Is the definition, “rational animal,” dangerous?  Of course it is, but so is “Dasein,” “ek-
sistent,” “being-in-the-world,” “shepherd of being,” and the technical vocabulary that Heidegger 
makes his own.  Every word in which we name ourselves is prone to misunderstanding.  All such 
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words may obscure instead of illuminate.  In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that “the ultimate 
business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein 
expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from leveling them off to that 
unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems.”82  Surely, human 
animality is one of those terms.  Aristotle sensibly observes, “And, of course, man is the animal 
with which we are all of us the most familiar.”83  Why capitulate to “common understanding” 
when it comes to animality?  Doesn’t that create what Heidegger rightly regards as a pseudo-
problem?   
Aquinas wrestles with the logic of definition to enable the human to transfigure the 
meaning of animality; he also indicates ways in which our bodies give us a grip on the 
particularity of the things of this world, a grip that has changed from epoch to epoch.  
Heidegger’s astute inquiry into the condition for the possibility of understanding being can 
reveal the riches of Aquinas’s thoughts about animation.  Aquinas touches upon fundamental 
ontology in relating the embodied intellect to that which is known, but he does not grasp the 
contours of the problematic in the radical manner pioneered by Heidegger.  Though Heidegger 
inquired into fundamental ontology, his neglect of animation hampers his efforts and closes him 
to the aspects that Aquinas’ thought allows us to perceive.  Hence, both Aquinas and Heidegger 
benefit from the encounter: Aquinas in becoming perspicacious regarding fundamental ontology 
and Heidegger in becoming perspicacious regarding the significance of animation for that 
project.  
Heidegger’s rejection of the classical term “rational animal” suggests he was unable to 
extricate himself completely from Descartes’s shadow by recovering a sense of life whose 
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outward display is ineluctably inward as well.  Saving the definition, rational animal, allows us 
to reconnect Dasein to living, bodily beings, and doing so makes fundamental ontology open to 
the sort of phenomenon of chief interest to Aristotle and Aquinas.  Even though the 
understanding of our bodies changes from epoch to epoch, and even though how an age and a 
thinker understands being shifts, the inclusion of our animate, formed bodies and their needs 
introduces a non-historical element into fundamental ontology.  The body provides an 
Aristotelian rather than a Platonic universal: a dynamic, flexible intelligibility woven into the 
fabric of being that allows us to make sense of the world and of ourselves.
84
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